Introduction
Studies on Colombian development generally distinguish between two stages in the industrialization process and in the official policy relating to it: the easier stage of import substitution, and the more difficult stage, in which substitution is combined with the promotion of exports of manufactures. The two stages are separated by the balance-of-payments crisis of the 1960s and the turnaround in economic policy imposed by Decree-Law 444 of 1967.
The result was not so much a structural change in the process of development as a transition towards a more complex economic policy, which had diverse consequences for the agents of development, above all the foreign enterprises. In this connection Ranis (1976, p. 99) , for example, indicates that "... during import substitution investment is channelled mainly into the industrial sector of the LDC, with the main contribution of the MNC one of adding to industrial savings, capital accumulation, and management capacity. At this point in time, when the market, the role of relative prices, efficiency, and so forth have been put aside, at least temporarily, in order to ensure as rapid a rate of industrial growth as possible, foreign capital and management can provide an important assist. This is usually a period when technology choice generally consists mainly in the act of turn-key borrowing from the "shelf of advanced country technology... In this period, the watchword is getting the job done as quickly as possible, with relatively little concern for efficiency -certainly not at international prices".
As the industrial sector advances, according to Ranis (1976, p. 101) , "... the role of appropriate technology and output mixes in penetrating international markets becomes much more important. One can now conceive of a benign and productive combination between the advantages of the MNC ... and the growing domestic expertise based on the specificity and peculiarities of the local resource endowment and institutional factors. ... Under generally more competitive conditions there is an increasing need for coming up with the right amalgam of imported and adaptive technologies and output mixes to ensure the continued outward-looking expansion of the industrial sector".
In the postwar period, the manufacturing sector gradually became the engine of the Co-lombian economy, raising its 13.5% share of the GDP in 1950 to 18.4% in 1975 , aided by a clear policy of industrial import substitution (ECLAC, 1978) . From that year, however, it began to lose dynamism and suffered a considerable fall in [1981] [1982] [1983] . At all events, the share of imports in the total supply of manufactures dropped from 20% in 1950-1952 to 15% in 1965-1967 , while imports corresponding to intermediate industries fell from 39% to 18%. Between 1965 Between -1967 Between and 1979 , import substitution declined in the traditional industries (2.5% to 5.3% of the total supply) and in the intermediate industries (18.2% to 21.3%) on account of the notable increase in the capacity to import at the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, this process continued in the more complex industries (metal products and machinery), so that the proportion of imports in the total supply of these manufactures fell from 58.4% to 43.3% (DANE, 1977 (DANE, ,1981aand 1981 . The share of exports in the total production of manufactures rose from 0.2% in 1950-1952 to 9.2% in 1975 , although it suffered a notable fall in 1979 (to 6.8%) through the loss of impetus in traditional industry (foodstuffs and textiles) and intermediate industry (chemicals and petroleum products). In these cases there is a clear distinction between two phases in the policy of industrial import substitution, namely, those of 1950-1957 and 1967-1982. Thus, in the period 1967-1982 Colombian industrial policy became more ambitious, simultaneously promoting import substitution in technically more complex industries (motor vehicles, petrochemicals, machinery) and the export of manufactures (above all those produced in the industries set up in the easy stage of import substitution), with the initial aim of alleviating the scarcity of foreign exchange brought about by the balance-of-payments crises.
For the enterprises with foreign participation, the new orientation of economic policy had implications which went beyond import substitution in its second phase or the export of manufactures, since they had to adapt themselves to a new administrative system based on exchange control in order to assess, authorize, register and control numerous aspects of foreign participation, which made itself felt in controls over investment, remittances (of profits, royalties and interest) and foreign trade (imports and exports). To these measures were added, by virtue of Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, the obligation to convert themselves into mixed enterprises in order to enjoy the benefits of the Andean market, and other limitations (e.g., some sectors were reserved for national and mixed enterprises; access to domestic credit and conditions for external credits were defined; and a ceiling was fixed for reinvestment unless officially authorized). Obviously, Decree 444 of 1967 imposed limits on the activities of enterprises with foreign participation from the balance-of-payments angle, while the Common System (Decision 24) established broad objectives in order to favour national and mixed enterprises in the enlarged market which resulted from Andean integration and to strengthen the bargaining capacity of the member countries vis-à-vis foreign participation. In essence, the official policy designated enterprises with foreign participation as agents of development and tried to ensure through the new system that they achieved the goals of the economic policy in a much wider sense than that of the balance of payments.
I
Official policy: a subsidiary role for foreign participants in the Colombian industrialization process
The new policy vis-à-vis foreign participants in the industrialization process was based on the following aims: to channel direct foreign investment towards substitution in the technologically more complex industries; to promote the export of manufactures; to reduce the foreign exchange
cost of the participation of foreign enterprises; and to increase the share of local capital in the industries dominated by foreign enterprises.
In 1967 and 1983 the direct foreign investment registered in the manufacturing sector was progressively directed towards the metal- Table I   COLOMBIA: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGISTERED IN  THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR , 1967 , -1983 lsic Industrial Division
Percentage breakdown 1967-1970 1975 1980 1983 1967-1970 1983 A. 1978, p. 93. 1977-1981 , calculated on the basis of foreign investment applications approved by the National Planning Departament of Colombia.
"Whereas the totals for 1970-1976 represent 100% of the authorizations for the said period, the totals for 1977-1981 represent the authorizations exceeding US$ 100 000 (around 83% of thé total amount authorized in the said period).
working industries which grew at a real annual cumulative rate of close on 4%, so that their share in the recorded total rose from 15% in 1967-1970 to over 24% in 1983 (table 1) . This is confirmed by analysis of the investments authorized for the same period (table 2). Not only did the share of the metal-working industry in the total authorizations rise from 20% to 34%, but also the average of each investment authorized in that industry soared from US$ 0.4 to US$ 3.5 million, whereas the average for all industrial divisions rose only from US$ 0.5 to US$ 2.7 million. The change of direction in the authorizations clearly showed itself in the records of direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector for 1981. The policy of directing this investment towards substitution in more complex industries such as the motor -vehicle and capital-goods industries was quite successful, judging by the figures on economic activities (tables 1 and 2). In the promotion of exports of manufactures, however, the enterprises with direct foreign investment have not displayed such positive results. For various reasons -mainly a competitive exchange rate and a broad programme of incentives-the manufacturing sector achieved a notable increase in its exports in 1967 -1974 (Echavarria and Perry, 1983 . After that period it lost impetus. The tax credit certificate benefits were reduced and the exchange rate for exports deteriorated (comparing 1975-1982 with 1967-1974) . To stimulate the activity of foreign enterprises, a policy was applied making new direct foreign investment conditional on an increase in the values of manufactured exports. The government authorities must have believed that the Source: Calculated on the basis of foreign investment applications approved by the National Planning Department of Colombia.
includes only investments exceeding US$ 100 000 (equivalent to 83% of the total value of the authorizations for the manufacturing sector).
high concentration of exports produced with direct foreign investment in a limited number of enterprises 1 would contribute to the success of the policy, since with a few export contracts there would be a notable change in the export performance of the enterprises, especially of those associated with the old substitution policy. Despite the fact that 51% of the authorizations for new direct foreign investment during 1977-1981 (table 3) involved contractual commitments with regard to exports of manufactures (above all in the chemical industry), however, the exports of the enterprises with this investment deteriorated vis-à-vis those of national enterprises (table 4).
With the exception of Cartón Colombia and, to a lesser degree, Cristalería Peldar, it is clear that the exports of manufactures did not come mainly from the dominant foreign enterprises associated with the phase of easier substitution, but from others. Thus, although it is obvious that the results of the policy of tying new investment to export contracts did not respond to the official intentions, it is no less certain that the specific policy applied on the subject has motivated many new foreign participants to export manufactures (tables 3 and 4).
With regard to the aim of reducing the forcing exchange cost of foreign participation in the manufacturing sector 2 , quite good results were obtained even during the foreign exchange 2 Several official studies have substantiated the high cost of direct foreign investment (Banco de la República, 1974 República, , 1973 República, a and 1973 . boom period generated by the record coffee exports of 1976-1980, which might well have caused a relaxation in the policy adopted. The greatest outflow of foreign currency was associated with the so-called importing vocation of the foreign enterprises. According to the calculations ofMisas (1983), between 1975-1979, i. e., at the height of the foreign exchange boom, the imports of these enterprises fell from 33% to 22% of the total value and inter-enterprise trade in total private imports fell from 29% to 21%. External payments (profits, dividends, royalties for technical services) also declined during the 1970s as a proportion of the direct foreign investment recorded in the sector (table 5) . By component, and as a percentage of the direct foreign investment recorded, royalties fell appreciably, payments for technical services remained constant and profits and dividends rose slightly. The modest size of the increase in payments of profits and dividends measured in proportion to the direct foreign investment is surprising for two reasons. In the first place, from 1977 onwards a higher limit was applied to the remittances of profits (20% instead of 14% of the investment registered). Then towards the end of the 1970s there arose a problem of "capital in limbo", that is, non-remittable profits which exceeded the new limit. The problem was solved in 1978 by means of Resolution 29 of the Economic and Social Policy Council, which permitted the remittance of 50% of the capital in limbo, provided that the foreign investor used the other half to purchase special bonds of the Industrial De- 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (1 A.) . This scant growth implies that even in the exceptional conditions of a foreign currency boom a reduction was achieved in the relative burden represented by foreign participation in industrialization with regard to its foreign exchange cost (table 5) .
In raising the share of local capital in industries dominated by foreign enterprises, it is clear that the policy of promoting mixed enterprises was successful. The new companies favoured by the policy of substitution in technologically more complex industries were made highly conditional on greater national (State) participation, as in the cases of Cía. Colombiana de Automotores S.A., Monómeros Colombo-Venezolanos S.A. and the Sociedad de Fabricación de Automotores S.A., which were the main mixed enterprises operating in Colombia up to 1982 (table 6). In 1980 the direct foreign investment registered in mixed enterprises came to 17% of the total of such investment in the manufacturing sector, and if Celanese Colombiana S.A. and Enka de Colombia S.A., which were converted into mixed enterprises two years later are included, the figure rises to 22%. Resolution 11 of the Monetary Board adopted in 1976 had a slight influence on the conversion of the foreign enterprises, as in the case of ALCAN de Colombia S.A. when it established a fund of US$ 50 million for the purchase of shares in foreign enterprises. Through disagreements among local groups, however, only 25% of the resources were allocated to the purpose indicated (Latin American Review, 1977 a, p. 3, and 1977 b, p. 203) . Another impact was made by the requirement of Decision 24 which compelled the foreign enterprises operating if! Colombia and wishing to export to the Andean market to sign transformation agreements with the National Planning Department (table 7) . The enterprises which had signed such agreements up to the end of 1982 represented, according to data for the year 1980, another 3% of the total of direct foreign investment reg- 
Source: Information from the register for 1980 and interviews.
a Foreign enterprises before 1982. 3 Thus the mixed enterprises and those in process of transformation represented 25% ofthe direct foreign investment registered in the manufacturing sector at the begining of the 1980s. These changes accord with the expressed intentions ofthe authorities, since between 1970-1976 and 1977-1981 they raised the authorizations for direct foreign investment in mixed enterprises (as against foreign and national enterprises) from 20.5 to 37.4% of the total value of the authorizations for these periods. In other words, the share of national enterprises in the capital of the companies accounting for foreign participation in the manufacturing sector increased considerably (tables 6 and 7).
It should be noted that these achievements of the policy as regards foreign participation in the industrialization process were not due to the efficient functioning ofthe Andean integration process, particularly in the case of the sectoral programmes of industrial development, and even of certain aspects of Decision 24. ECLAC studies show clearly that towards the end ofthe 1970s, at least, the sectoral programmes had not worked well, having failed to promote the new investment needed or to motivate the foreign enterprises to change into mixed companies in order to participate in the programmes (Gana, 1977; Garay, 1977 and Mortimore, 1978) . Enterprises such as ccA, soFASA and Monómeros were mixed before the application of sectoral programmes in the motor-vehicle and petrochemical branches, and the subsequent transformation of companies such as Celanese and Enka was not particularly related to the petrochemical programme. Perhaps the only important case of transformation into a mixed enterprise directly linked with the programming is that of Carboquímica S.A., which produced only one product falling within the allocations ofthe petrochemical programme. Nor did the Andean market play a very important role in the expansion of foreign enterprises in Colombia, since they generally took the view that the domestic market was more attrac- tive or that other variables (such as the level of protection offered by the common external tariff) could be more important for enterprises with direct foreign investment than access to the rest of the Andean Group (Pérez Salazar, 1980, p. 72) . It is clear, therefore, that the incentives provided by these instruments had no great influence on the decisions ofthe enterprises, since the negative aspect ofthe instruments (exclusion of the foreign enterprises) was more obvious than the positive (possibility of accelerated growth in a large market). In other words, the degree of success that the policy of promoting mixed enterprises has achieved is not basically due to the incentives offered by the Andean instruments, but rather to Colombian internal factors. Now, all the official indicators and data, and even the unofficial ones too, agree that (with the exception of the aim of increasing exports of manufactures) the official policy largely achieved the goals it set itself. If this is so, it would mean that the official policy of assigning to foreign participation a subsidiary role in Colombian industrialization gave quite good results. To verify this hypothesis the author directly approached the main industrial firms with a foreign element for their views on the economic policy and its effects on foreign participation in the industrial sector during the-period 1967-1982. A survey was made of the 30 largest firms (on the basis of their sales in 1982) with foreign participation in the manufacturing sector, representing 58.4% of the foreign investment registered in the manufacturing sector at the end of 1980. Of this sample, the questionnaire was answered by 24 firms which represent 50.7% of the foreign investment registered in the manufacturing sector at the end of 1980 and 35.9% ofthe total foreign investment (excluding petroleum) recorded in the same year. To reach a total of at least 25 enterprises two interesting cases were added : Exportadora Dupont, one of the foreign firms which exports most manufactures in Colombia; and Carboquímica, a foreign company in process of transformation which competed directly with a national company, both producing one of the items of the Andean Group petrochemical programme. Thus the enterprises surveyed reached 26 (table 8) .
The survey consisted of a qualitative part, with opinions on the industrial and export-promotion policies, on the administrative system for assessing, authorizing, registering and controlling foreign investment and technology, and on the role of Colombia as a recipient of foreign investment. The quantitative part was devoted to an inquiry on various aspects of the performance of the enterprises.
The interviews which accompanied the survey were held in May and June of 1983 in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. 1979 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1979 1979 1980 1975 1979 1979 1980 1979 1983 1980 1979 1980 1978 1980 1979 1980 1979 1979 1979 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and interviews with the enterprises, "Millions of pesos. [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] The inquiry began with two general questions. If a distinction is made between the goal of substitution of imports in the industries with more complex technology (su complex) and the promotion of exports of manufactures (x manuf.) and the period 1967-1982 is divided into two subperiods (1967-1974 and 1975-1982 As may be seen from the results, the entrepreneurs found that the Colombian industrial policy during the period 1967-1982 had had a marked emphasis. Opinions were very divided as to which objective (substitution of imports of the complex industries or exports of manufactured products) was more successful during the period 1967 (after Decree 444 of 1967 .
On dividing the period 1967-1982 into two subperiods, it became clear that the goal for 1967-1974 was mainly to promote industrial exports an in a lesser degree to substitute imports in complex industries. The subperiod 1975 The subperiod -1982 was ambiguous for these important entrepreneurs, however, since 11 voted for the promotion of the export of manufactures as the more successful goal, 10 opted for the substitution of imports in complex industries and 5 could not decide.
The entrepreneurs considered that the overall results during 1967-1982 were only moderate (12 enterprises) or slight (11 enterprises); only 3 considered that the results had been good. It is probable that these rather negative opinions on the industrial policy reflect in particular their experience during the period after 1975, when the industrial impetus declined, first as a result of the foreign exchange boom and then because of the difficulties experienced by entire sectors, such as the motor-vehicle industry, in which the leading enterprises have suffered losses for two to four years running. 1967-1982 and the subperiods 1967-1974 and 1975-1982 The entrepreneurs showed a critical attitude in the adjectives chosen to characterize the in- 4 In the survey the entrepreneurs were asked to select 3 adjectives for each period. In tabulating these results the first choice was weighted by 3, the second by 2 and the third by 1. The adjectives with the highest marks mentioned for each period represented 56, 78 and 47% of the total number of options for the periods 1967-1974, 1975-1982 and 1967-1982, respectively . The values represent "votes" from a total of 156 (i.e., 26 x 6). In addition, in order to collect the total number of possible replies to this question three options were left blank so that the entrepreneur could choose adjectives not included in the survey. dustrial policy in 1967-1974, 1975-1982 and the total period 1967-1982 . The first subperiod was described as integrationist, protectionist and nationalist and, to a lesser degree, technicalist and monetarist. This assessment seems to accord well with the Colombian experience of serious balance-of-payments problems in the mid-1960s and the intention of the new industrial policy announced in Decree-Law 444 and the Cartagena Agreement. The second subperiod was described as monetarist, open-market oriented and political and, to a lesser degree, integrationist; these adjectives admirably represent the essence of the new neo-liberal trend that was introduced into Colombia in 1975 
Question: How wouldyou describe Colombian industrial policy during the period
139 156 The greatest degree of consistency is seen included in national private enterprises.
in respect of the question as to which sectors benefited most from the industrial policy. During the subperiod 1967-1974, according to the entrepreneurs, the beneficiaries were national private enterprises, the State, and to a lesser degree foreign enterprises. Those who benefited most from the industrial policy in [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] were national private enterprises (including financial groups), the State, and foreign enterprises. In the period 1967-1982, the entrepreneurs considered that the beneficiaries of the industrial policy were national private enterprises (including financial groups and foreigntrade enterprises) and the State. Foreign enterprises figure to a much lesser extent. There appear to be two criteria involved here. On the one hand, the entrepreneurs of these large firms with foreign participation felt that there was discrimination in favour of national enterprises. This view was undoubtedly the result of the application of one of the stated aims of Decision 24, namely, that it was necessary to establish common rules for foreign investment in consonance with the new conditions created by the Cartagena Agreement, so that the advantages deriving from it would favour the national or mixed enterprises as defined in the statute. On the other hand, in 1975-1982 the mention of financial groups as beneficiaries of the industrial policy might mean that, according to this view, even national private-sector industrialists were prejudiced by the lack of a clear industrial policy.
In sum, the opinions of the entrepreneurs of the largest firms with foreign participation in the manufacturing sector indicate that for them the industrial policy during the period 1967-1982 became increasingly more confused as regards the main goal (substitution of industrial imports in the industries with more complex technology or the promotion of exports of manufactures) the results of this policy were only moderate, if not downright meagre; and although the integrationist and protectionist policy in 1967-1974 benefited mainly national private enterprises and the State rather than foreign enterprises, the monetarism and open-market orientation of the following period channelled the benefits towards non-industrial national private enterprises and the State.
Hence, they complain that an initial prejudice of the industrial policy against foreign en- The opinions of these entrepreneurs on the policy for the promotion of industrial exports during 1967-1982 are very clear. The most important instruments, in their view, are almost exclusively the incentives. Thus, in general they thought that the financing by PROEXPO, the Tax Credit Certificates (CAT) and the Valiejo Plan were the most important instruments during [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] . To quote a report of the Banco de la República, "PROEXPO'S action can be described as integral and covers the basic cycle of external marketing, from market research, supply of information, direct promotion abroad, technical assistance and handling of insurance, up to the flexible, timely and generous granting of credit to the exporter on very favourable terms. Recently, in view of the need to intensify still further the efforts to develop external sales, new instruments have been brought into use, likewise in close collaboration with PROEXPO. These relate to the creation in 1979 of international marketing companies and the development of forms of international subcontracting. The basic aim of the former is to technify the work of external marketing, especially in support of small and medium-sized firms which individually do not possess the technical and financial capacity to develop an efficient external sales strategy. Moreover, these societies, given their knowledge of the external market and of domestic possibilities, will be able to invest in the sectors which offer the best prospects, or act as intermediaries of foreign investment. At the same time, they engage in the importation of inputs to supply domestic needs, particulary those required by national producers who export through them. International subcontracting, for its part, constitutes an agreement whereby a national manufacturer supplies partially or fully assembled articles to a foreign industry, which undertakes to market the resulting product. "In the fiscal field" (continues the report), "Tax Credit Certificates (CAT) were created for the benefit of exporters of non-traditional products. These certificates, which are freely negotiable and can be used when they mature for the payment of any type of tax, have been subjected to various reforms designed to give them a selective character in order to adapt them to the external competitiveness requirements of national production.
"Similarly, it should be noted that the exchange rate statute maintains a special import and export system, in force since the beginning of the 1960s and known as the Valiejo Plan. Through this system, national producers can bring into the country, free of all tariff charges, prior permits, deposits and other requirements, raw materials, intermediate products and goods destined for export" (Banco de la República, 1982, pp. 76 and 77) .
During the subperiods 1967-1974 and 1975-1982 the factors voted for were the same, with a relative change of emphasis in the sense that in 1967-1974 CAT came first, followed by PROEXPO and the Valiejo Plan, whereas in 1975-1982 PRO-EXPO was first followed by CAT and the Valiejo Plan. For both the subperiods and the whole period 1967-1982 the incentives mentioned represented between 83% and 86% of the replies given by these entrepreneurs.
The marked tendency to give special emphasis to the incentives among the various instruments and factors was also manifest in the enterprises which managed to increase the share of exports in their total sales in 1967-1974 and 1975-1982 Considering that only 2 of the 13 enterprises which had export contracts with INCOMEX did not achieve the goal agreed up to the end of 1982 and that the tying policy is in a legally weak position for applying fines, it is surprising that the opinions of these entrepreneurs are so unfavourable. Perhaps the explanation lies in their repeated comment that failure to fulfil the contract brought with it practical consequences as regards the official authorizations required in other aspects of their operations (new investment, imports, technology contracts, price increases).
Many complained that "one cannot export by decree" and that there was a gap between the policy of export promotion and the economic policy in [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] . It seems, however, that they were more concerned about a new increase in the power of the administrative system to assess, authorize, register and control foreign investment and technology in Colombia, as expressed in the tying policy with regard to exports. In the view of the entrepreneurs, the general objectives of the administrative system were to regulate remittances abroad, direct foreign investment to specific sectors or activities, promote mixed enterprises and co-ordinate foreign participation with the goals of the economic policy. For the enterprises, the factors with the greatest influence in 1967-1982 were the regulation of remittances abroad, the incentivation of industrial exports, the promotion of mixed enterprises, the improvement of the transfer of foreign technology, and the reservation of local credit for national enterprises. Themost influential factors were practically the same in the two subperiods: in 1967-1974 the most noted factors were the regulation of remittances abroad, the incentivation of industrial exports, the promotion of mixed enterprises, the improvement of the transfer of foreign technology and the reservation of local credit for national enterprises; in 1975-1982 the order of the factors process, the entrepreneurs of these large firms, with the exception of one enterprise which did not answer this question, declared that Colombia had been "moderately satisfactory" as a recipient of foreign investment during 1967-1982. Nineteen of them were of this opinion, while five considered Colombia "bad" as a recipient and one opted for "good". Considering the two subperiods-separately, however, it is evident that according to them Colombia was a much better recipient of foreign investment in 1967-1974 than in 1975-1982 . For the first subperiod the predominant adjectives were "good" and "moderately satisfactory", whereas for the subperiod 1975-1982 they were "moderately satisfactory" and "bad". It is obvious, therefore, that the persons interviewed considered that Colombia's situation as a recipient of foreign investment worsened in 1975-1982 as compared with 1967-1974 , although this subperiod witnessed the initiation of the new administrative system for assessing, authorizing, registering and controlling foreign investment and technology, based on foreign exchange control and greater negotiating power on the part of the official sector. Their opinions are reflected in table 2, which shows that the real value of direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector was barely maintained between 1977 and 1981.
Question: How would you characterize Colombia
To sum up, with the exception of the promotion of exports of manufactures, the Colombian policy designed to bring foreign participation in line with the official goals (i.e., to direct investment towards substitution in technologically more complex industries, to reduce the foreign exchange cost of foreign participation and to improve national participation) has been a success, in the opinion of the entrepreneurs affected. On the basis of these assessments it may readily be concluded that the official policy has had a marked effect in reorienting foreign participation in Colombian industrialization towards a Finally, when asked whether they thought official policies of other Latin American countries were more favourable to foreign investment than that of Colombia, 16 answered yes, quoting mainly the cases of Brazil and Chile and holding that their policies offered greater incentives and less rigorous conditions than that of Colombia. Nevertheless, very few of the entrepreneurs were able to make a formal distinction between the basic features of the Brazilian model and the Chilean one, so that their preferences seemed to lack a solid foundation. subsidiary role. The technical influence of the administrative system for assessing, authorizing, registering and controlling participation in a continuous and progressive manner gave rise to the following comment by the Board of the Cartagena Agreement (1979, p. 53) : "An analysis of the functioning of the institutional structure responsible for the authorization, registration and control of foreign investment in Colombia leads to the general conclusion that it has had satisfactory results and that Colombia now has a wide experience at its command which can be profitably used by some of the other countries".
Ill Conclusions
Nonetheless, there are still certain doubts (which go beyond the scope of this article) as to its capacity to impose a subsidiary role on the foreign participants. For instance, although it is quite true that progress has been made in "Colombianization", it is not known whether this process was independent of or detrimental to "modernization". The new direct foreign investment has been channelled towards the metal manufactures and machinery industry, but, judging by the precarious state of several of the largest enterprises in this sector (especially the motorvehicle industries) during the present crisis, it is not at all clear that the new investment is going to speed up the growth of the sector as a whole. Moreover, the mediocre results in exports of manufactures obtained by the enterprises with a foreign element might indicate the obsolescence of the technologies employed. It is possible that some foreign firms have transformed themselves into mixed or national companies to evade the obligation to export, while continuing to take advantage of the domestic market. Additionally, although the reason is not very obvious, it is noticeable that the introduction of a subsidiary role for foreign participants coincided with the loss of dynamism in the Colombian industrialization process. Finally, from a comparative angle, it is not quite clear to what extent the relatively meagre participation of foreign investment in Colombian industry has played a part in the success obtained in redefining such participation. 
